It is understandable that all parties must focus on fighting the common enemy COVID-19, but the Tatmadaw and the Northern Alliance and KIO should try to revive the stalled talks in order to reach bilateral ceasefire agreements. They should push themselves to define the provisional framework for practical and effective negotiations. Two “successes” have been reported this year: the adoption of 20 additional principles for the Union`s peace agreements and an agreement between the parties to continue formal peace talks with the new government. The 20 points raised by the Tatmadaw do not constitute breakthroughs that will really put an end to the persistent hostilities with the signatory EAOs, nor does the EAOs` agreement on these new proposals take new paths for future compromises. Like the previous 37 principles, these newcomers are hampered by vague language and do not offer a roadmap for their implementation. From the EAO`s point of view, the most useful outcome of the talks was undoubtedly the signal of the continuation of peace talks after the elections. Many observers of the process are wondering what this next iteration will look like. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA); In Burma: Nationwide Ceasefire Treaty) was a pioneering ceasefire agreement between the government of Myanmar and representatives of various ethnic insurgent groups, officially referred to by the government as “ethnic armed organizations” (EAOs). The draft was adopted on 31 March 2015 by the majority of the invited parties[1] and the agreement was signed by President Thein Sein on 15 October 2015. [2] The signing was observed by observers and delegates from the United Nations, the United Kingdom, Norway, Japan and the United States. [3] [4] A ceremony is organized by the government each year on the anniversary of the signing of the agreement.

[5] [6] Armed conflicts in Myanmar act as a vicious circle and are marked by militarization, radical ethnic ideology and deep resentment towards Myanmar`s central government and the Tatmadaw. Subnational conflicts support ethnic rivalry and competition for economic and political resources and compete for territorial control between EAOs and Tatmadaw. While the ACA expects some of these issues to be resolved, the process could produce negative results for the country`s politics if effective participation of different ethnic groups is not achieved. However, with growing private, public and international interests in Myanmar`s politics, the stakes are high. Therefore, the failure of the agreement to achieve constructive results could damage political relations between Myanmar and the rest of the world. As the National League for Democracy completes its first term in government this year, peacebuilding in Myanmar is at a crossroads. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (ANAC) is the most ambitious attempt to reach a comprehensive peace agreement to date, but since it was signed in 2015, the level of violence has been higher than ever in some municipalities and formal peace negotiations have excluded key players in Myanmar`s ongoing conflicts in the northeast and west. Ceasefires in Myanmar have been widely used by the Burmese government as a policy to contain ethnic rebel groups and create temporary ceasefires.

The first ceasefire was organized in 1989 by the State Law and Order Restoration Council, headed specifically by Khin Nyunt, then head of the military secret service, with the National Democratic Alliance Army, led by Kokang, which had recently separated from the Burmese Communist Party due to internal conflicts. [1] By the late 1980s, the Burmese Communist Party (CPB) had weakened considerably due to declining financial support from China and internal conflicts. During the 1988 uprising, the KPB did not take advantage of the opportunity to make political changes. .